

preferring a different emendation of οὔτε λιταῖς(ιν).

(i) Stinton rightly recognized that, if Sophocles wrote οὔτε γόοισιν οὐ λιταῖς, this is an 'extreme case', with no exact parallel, of οὔτε . . . οὐ separated by only one word; and it was partly for that reason that he expressly hesitated to put it into the text.<sup>19</sup>

(ii) Editors have in general been content with the sense ' . . . nor with prayers', with or without emendation (Kells accepting Erfurdt's οὔτ' εὐχαῖς, others favouring Hermann's οὔτ' ἄνταις).<sup>20</sup> No one seems to have questioned that sense. The chorus are not otherwise concerned to protest against useless *praying*. The whole thrust of their argument, from 121–3 onwards, has been, and will continue to be, directed against Electra's unremitting, insatiate (ἀκόρεστον) *lamentation* as at once unprofitable and 'ruinous' (141 διόλλυται, etc.).

I propose that we should read οὔτε γόοισιν οὔτ' ἄταις. A little-noticed use of ἄτη in later fifth-century tragic lyric, in close conjunction with words such as γόος, ἔλεος, θρήνος, στεναγμός, alludes to the 'hurt' bloodily self-inflicted (especially by women) in lamentations for the dead. Cf. especially E. *Or.* 960–2 κατάρχομαι στεναγμόν . . . τιθεία . . . αἱματηρόν ἄταν,<sup>21</sup> but also *Tro.* 121 ἄτας κελαδεῖν ἀχορεύτους (following 119 ἐπιούς' αἰεὶ δακρύων ἔλεος), and *I.T.* 148–9 †αἴτ' μοι συμβαίνουσ' ἄται | κύγγονον ἄμον κατακλαιομέναι (following 146 ἀλύροις ἔλεος). In our Parodos, ἄται (pl.) is thematic, and perhaps archetypal in the relevant sense,<sup>22</sup> in direct or indirect reference to Electra's 'self-hurtful' behaviour: 215–16 οἰκείας εἰς ἄτας | ἐμπίπτουσ' οὕτως αἰκῶς, 223–5 ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ δεινοῖς οὐ χήσας | ταύτας ἄτας, | ὄφρα με βίος ἔχῃ, 235 μὴ τίττειν σ' ἄταν ἄταις (with an obvious play on two senses). The pairing οὔτε γόοισιν οὔτ' ἄταις (now more nearly synonymous) is like the Euripidean Electra's στοναχαῖς τε καὶ γόοις at *Or.* 204. For an explanation of the corruption we need look no further than misreading of . . . ΑΤΑΙC as . . . ΑΙΤΑΙC (at sentence-end) in a context where 'prayers' gives acceptable sense.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> My attention has been drawn to Dawe's latest thought οὐ λοιβαῖς (Teubner Einzelausgaben, 1995), which is open to the same (not in itself fatal) objection.

<sup>20</sup> ἄντ- for λιτ- is technically plausible, but ἄντη lacks sufficient attestation: only Hsch. ἄντησι (codd. ἀντήσει)· λιτανείαις, ἀντήσει. ἄντησι also is known only from Hesychius.

<sup>21</sup> See my commentary (1989, with Addendis Addenda), pp. 141–2, 365; I am now more inclined to read (with Diggle) τιθεία λευκᾶν ὄνυχι διὰ παρηίδων αἰμ- ἄτ-.

<sup>22</sup> A date for S. *El.* shortly before E. *Tro.* and *I.T.* would be consistent with other indications (cf. my commentary on *Or.* p. lvi n. 91), reinforced by further metrical studies which I hope to publish in due course.

<sup>23</sup> A reader objects that 'no one sought to raise dead fathers by ἄταις', and another suggests οὔτ' ἀχαῖς 'if one is to go down this avenue'. The objection is misconceived: the argument is simply 'No amount of lamenting will bring your dead father back from Hades', as a self-evident ἀδύνατον; a rhetorical point similar to δοκεῖς τοῖσι σοῖς δακρύοις . . . κρατῆσειν ἐχθρῶν in the Parodos of Euripides' *Electra* (193–5). No one sought to gain the upper hand over their foes by δάκρυα. As to the suggested ἀχαῖς, 'loud utterance(s)' is relatively weak sense, and ἀχ- typically corrupts to ἰαχ-. More seriously, ἡχῇ, like ἡχώ, is a word used only in the singular.

#### THE MEANING OF *REPUBLIC* 606a3–b5

Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις  
συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρύσαι τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι  
ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὃν τοιοῦτον οἶον τούτων ἐπι-

606a3

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θυμείν, τότ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον  
καὶ χαίρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς  
παιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίσχιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ  
θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ  
οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὄν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαί-  
ρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν [·] ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν  
ἡγείται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι  
καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος.

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If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes, was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but [he] thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain, and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether.<sup>1</sup>

In his recent commentary on Plato's *Republic* Book 10, Stephen Halliwell wrestles with the problem of meaning and syntax in 606a3–b5.<sup>2</sup> For Halliwell, 'the required sense' of the passage originates in the assumption that τὸ βέλτιστον (i.e. τὸ λογιστικόν)<sup>3</sup> of the soul must not be corrupted in any way by the pleasure received from viewing a tragic drama. Otherwise, the idea of the best part of the soul being susceptible to such corruption would contradict Plato's very notion of the tripartite structure of the soul.<sup>4</sup> However, we will argue that Plato does indeed hold that the best part of the soul, if not suitably educated, may be vulnerable to emotions

<sup>1</sup> References to the text of Plato are to the Oxford Classical Text edition of J. Burnet, vol. iv (Oxford, 1903). The only alteration of the text in this passage is the replacement of a comma after ἐλεεῖν (b3) by a high stop. The translation is by P. Shorey, *Plato: The Republic*, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1935), vol. II, p. 461. In line 7 Shorey's translation reads 'it' and his Greek text adopts the high stop after ἐλεεῖν as well.

<sup>2</sup> Halliwell, *Plato Republic 10* (Warminster, 1988). On p. 67 Halliwell translates the pertinent part of the passage (606a7–b5) as follows:

And the part of us which is naturally superior, insofar as it hasn't been adequately trained by reasoning or even by habit, slackens its control over this grieving capacity, on the grounds that they are other people's sufferings which it is watching and there is nothing shameful for oneself in approving and pitying when someone who purports to be a good man shows inappropriate grief. On the contrary, it regards that element—pleasure—as the value of the experience, and it would not be prepared to forego it by spurning the entire poem.

On p. 148 he comments:

The grammar of the sentence, if taken strictly, makes it seem that it is the best part of the soul which is lulled into enjoying the emotional experience of poetry, even though that is clearly not the required sense; . . . The incongruity is caused by the analytical separation of psychological faculties within the coherent experience of the individual.

<sup>3</sup> 605a8–b6 explicitly interchanges τὸ βέλτιστον and τὸ λογιστικόν. Socrates says that since the products of painting do not appeal to the best part of the soul (μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, b1), they can destroy it, i.e. the rational part (ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, b4–5).

<sup>4</sup> The issue of whether the soul's parts are further divisible still invites vigorous scholarly debate. As is clear from Halliwell's comment, the position one takes can impinge directly on the translation of 606a3–b5. The assumptions and/or positions found in the work of Jowett–Campbell, *Plato's Republic* (Oxford, 1894) vol. iii; J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge, 1902; repr. 1929), vol. 2; Shorey, ad loc.; N. R. Murphy, *The Interpretation of Plato's Republic* (Oxford, 1951); T. Penner, 'The doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium', in G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato II: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame, 1978), pp. 96–118; A. Nehamas,

which are stirred up, for example, during the viewing of a tragic performance. Whatever the consequences are for Plato's theory of the soul, the passage under examination makes it clear that at least here he is willing to speak in these terms. To support this thesis, the following arguments, based on a reconsideration of grammar and context, are offered: (i) the subject of the sentence throughout a7–b3 is τὸ βέλτιστον ('it'); (ii) there is a change of subject with ἀλλ' (b3) from τὸ βέλτιστον ('it') to 'a man'.

To begin with, two parts of the soul are given in the passage: τὸ . . . κατεχόμενον (the irrational part,<sup>5</sup> a3) and τὸ . . . βέλτιστον (the rational part, a7). We maintain that the subject of the sentence throughout a7–b3 is τὸ βέλτιστον; its main verb is ἀνίστην (a8); and it is modified by two subordinate clauses, both introduced by the causal conjunction ἄτε (a7 and b1). In the first ἄτε clause, we agree with all major recent commentators and translators in regarding τὸ βέλτιστον as the subject of the participle πεπαιδευμένον. It is in the second ἄτε clause that disagreement arises. Although we agree that the subject of θεωροῦν is τὸ βέλτιστον, most major commentators this century have understood αἰσχρὸν ὄν as an accusative absolute whose own impersonal subject signals a change in the main subject of the sentence. Those who take αἰσχρὸν ὄν as an accusative absolute have to explain ἐαυτῷ as an indirect reflexive which takes its antecedent from outside its clause.<sup>6</sup> But a suitable masculine subject in another clause is lacking. Both Adam and Halliwell, following Jowett–Campbell, see a change of subject, i.e. ἐαυτῷ as masculine,<sup>7</sup> and assume that Plato must be talking about the whole soul or the person since it is impossible, they believe, that the rational part of the soul could approve (ἐπαινεῖν) or feel pity for (ἐλεεῖν) another person in pain. But if one sets aside this assumption concerning the rational part of the soul in Plato, the nearest candidate for the indirect reflexive, ἐαυτῷ, is τὸ βέλτιστον. To attribute this change of subject to a typically Platonic anacolouthon<sup>8</sup> misconstrues a grammatically constructed sentence, and ignores the

'Plato on Imitation and Poetry in *Republic* 10', in J. Moravcsik and P. Temko (edd.), *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts* (Totowa, NJ, 1982), pp. 47–78; Halliwell ad loc.; T. Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford, 1995); and P. Murray, *Plato on Poetry: Ion; Republic 376e–398b9; Republic 595–608b10* (Cambridge, 1996) indicate the presence of this problem from the end of the 19th century to the present day.

<sup>5</sup> Plato describes what is being 'restrained' (τὸ . . . κατεχόμενον) as τὸ ἀλόγιστον (604d9) or as τὸ ἀναγκαστικόν (604e2). In this section of the *Republic* Plato seems to be concentrating on a bipartite view of the soul, though in Book 4 he had developed a tripartite scheme. See Halliwell's note on 602c4 (n. 3), p. 133.

<sup>6</sup> On such indirect reflexives see Kühner–Gerth i.561–2. It is tempting to take the phrase as does G. Stallbaum, *Platonis Opera Omnia: Politiae Libri VI–X* (London, 1859<sup>2</sup>), who, in his comment on καὶ ἐαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν, says: 'h.e. καὶ νομιζόμενον ἐαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι nam ἄτε etiam ad nominativum absolutum referri debet . . . sensus hic est: quippe alienas spectans perturbationes atque sibi nullam afferre turpitudinem existimans, . . .' But whatever way one decides to take the phrase, it makes no difference to our argument, since even in the case of the accusative absolute, the antecedent of the indirect reflexive ἐαυτῷ must be τὸ βέλτιστον.

<sup>7</sup> Jowett–Campbell (n. 5), p. 456, comment on ἐαυτῷ: 'Plato passes from the rational part of the soul to the man himself'. Adam (n. 5), p. 414, cites Jowett–Campbell approvingly and then adds: 'Hence καταφρονήσας below. The antithesis with ἄλλος ἀνὴρ makes the meaning clear'. A sudden change of subject is not uncommon in Plato (for parallels, see Jowett–Campbell, *Essays*, vol. II, pp. 246–7), but in this particular passage Jowett–Campbell have misunderstood where the change takes place.

<sup>8</sup> For such rhetorical anacoloutha see Kühner–Gerth ii.590–1. For anacoloutha in Plato, see L. Reinhard, *Die Anakolutha bei Platon* (Berlin, 1920).

clear description of τὸ βέλτιστον as οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγω οὐδὲ ἔθει which sets the stage for the rational part to be compromised in some way. Given this qualification of τὸ βέλτιστον, it makes sense for the actions of the rational part to be evaluated according to whether or not they cause shame to it.

At 606b1, the best part of the soul is actually watching 'other people's sufferings' (ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν).<sup>9</sup> In addition, the context of this part of Socrates' speech is that of a person's λογιστικόν becoming vulnerable to certain emotional acts as a result of personal misfortunes (τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς a3). Further, the context within which this part of the passage is set speaks of a person viewing characters on stage who are undergoing pain in their lives (605c10–d5 and 606b3ff.). Plato is concerned that such repeated viewings will lead to a situation in which a person behaves in a similarly emotional manner toward events in his own life.

We then posit a change of subject from τὸ βέλτιστον to a masculine subject, 'a man', beginning at ἀλλ'. This is unambiguous because the participle καταφρονήσας is masculine,<sup>10</sup> and therefore the subject of both main verbs (ἡγείται and δέξαιτο) is masculine, i.e. 'a man', understood.<sup>11</sup> This is necessary since in this part of the passage Plato explicitly reveals the context of a person viewing a tragic or poetic performance. Here is the proper place to assume ἀνὴρ ('a man') as the implicit subject of the verbs ἡγείται and δέξαιτο.<sup>12</sup> The subject implied by ἄλλος ἀνὴρ, then, has been thrown forward, not backward to ἐαυτῷ. On this view, the grammar is not as stretched as it is according to the interpretation of Jowett–Campbell and Adam (and Halliwell by implication), who use ἄλλος ἀνὴρ to imply not only a subject without a verb but its reflexive as well (ἐαυτῷ). The presence of τὴν ἡδονήν (606b4) helps link this part of the passage firmly to the context since pleasure is an integral part of the witnessing of poetic performances.

With the appearance of 'pleasure' in the passage, it is possible to sympathize with Halliwell's general position that pleasure, in Plato's view, could not directly mix with the rational part of the soul. Pleasure affects the person or soul as a whole. Halliwell cites 602e4ff. as an analogous anomaly to 606a3–b5. In the former passage, the discussion concerns the ability of the senses to fool the λογιστικόν. In 606a3–b7 the qualification of the rational part as insufficiently educated regarding its λόγος and habit implies that the rational part is in a particular state in which it is vulnerable to certain corrupting influences. In this passage the influence can result in the acts of approving and pitying another person when he is in pain. The notion of a 'state' is implicit in the admission that even the rational part, independently, must be trained and educated. Plato is moving from the view that the rational part can be in a state of vulnerability to corrupting influences due to lack of training (right up to b3,

<sup>9</sup> Halliwell (n. 3) translates this phrase exactly as we do, with the same emphasis on 'other'. Although Murray (n. 5) in her translation of this passage acknowledges that the subject of θεωροῦν is the neuter τὸ βέλτιστον, she adds, 'θεωροῦν (which suggests a spectator) is nominative'. This is contradictory since, on the one hand, her translation indicates that τὸ βέλτιστον can in fact watch other people's sufferings, and on the other, her note agrees with Adam in seeing a change of subject with ἐαυτῷ.

<sup>10</sup> No textual variants are recorded.

<sup>11</sup> The neuter demonstrative, ἐκεῖνο, is the object of ἡγείται, not its subject. τὴν ἡδονήν acts as an exegetical appositive to ἐκεῖνο. Kühner–Gerth, i.658, cite this passage as an example of this construction.

<sup>12</sup> After ἐλεεῖν there should be a high stop, as in the text of Shorey (n. 1).

ἐλεεῖν) to the view that the soul as a whole (i.e. the person) can be corrupted (from b3, ἀλλ' to the end of the speech) by pleasure.<sup>13</sup>

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### SCENTS AND SENSIBILITY IN PLAUTUS' *CASINA*

When Lysidamus arrives on stage in Plautus' *Casina*, he delightedly announces that he is in love with the slave girl Casina.<sup>1</sup> He is returning, he says, from an expedition to buy perfume which he hopes has made him appealing to his beloved. Casina's name is derived from the fragrant spice *casia*. Cassia and the related spice cinnamon originate in the Far East and were imported to Rome through Arabia or Africa.<sup>2</sup> Like other ancient spices, cassia was used as perfume, condiment, and in medicinal and religious contexts.<sup>3</sup> A Roman audience would have been ready to laugh, or groan, at punning references to fragrant cosmetics or condiments in a play about a woman named Casina. Playing on Casina's aromatic name, the old man asserts that love is the best of all condiments: *neque salsum neque suave esse potest quicquam, ubi amor non admiscetur* (222).<sup>4</sup> He imagines that his love for Casina works like a cosmetic, making him very appealing indeed: *quom amo Casinam, magis niteo, munditiis Munditiam antideo* (225). When the old man's wife, Cleostrata, smells the perfumes he is wearing (236), she sharply rebukes him: *senecta aetate unguentatus per vias, ignave, incedis?* (240). In her view, the perfume-buying excursion runs counter to the civic values which a *senex* should uphold, as does his erotic pursuit of Casina. When the *Casina* was performed in Rome in 185,<sup>5</sup> audience reactions to Lysidamus' shopping trip might be affected by prohibitions on the sale of *unguenta exotica* which had been declared by the censors in 189.<sup>6</sup> In pursuing Casina, Lysidamus is metaphorically pursuing a pleasing scent such as he sought out in the perfume shops. Once Lysidamus' soliloquy and his confrontation with Cleostrata have brought the notion of how things smell into the foreground, the issue continues to come up. The metaphor of smell is used to describe aroused suspicions (266). Olympio, the rustic estate manager whom Lysidamus hoped to marry to Casina, complains at one point

<sup>1</sup> The old man is not named in the play; the name Lysidamus is read in the scene headings in the Ambrosian palimpsest, but may not be Plautine: cf. G. E. Duckworth, 'The unnamed characters in the plays of Plautus', *CP* 33 (1938), 267–82.

<sup>2</sup> Ancient references to cassia are surveyed by Olck, 'Casia', *RE* 3.2 (1899), 1637–51. For descriptions of cinnamon and cassia see D. J. Mabberly, *The Plant Book: A Portable Dictionary of the Higher Plants* (Cambridge, 1987), s.v. Cinnamomum (pp. 126–7); on the ancient trade in cinnamon and cassia see L. Casson, 'Cinnamon and Cassia in the Ancient World,' in *Ancient Trade and Society* (Detroit, 1984), pp. 225–46. J. Innes Miller, *The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire: 29 B.C. to A.D. 641* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 42–7, 153–72, while perhaps going too far in viewing Pliny's references to traders in rudderless rafts (*H.N.* 12.87–8) as evidence for trade routes between Indonesia and Madagascar, nevertheless provides much of interest.

<sup>3</sup> On the range of uses for ancient spices see Miller (above, n. 2), pp. 1–9.

<sup>4</sup> The pun is cautiously noted by W. T. MacCary and M. M. Willcock, *Plautus, Casina* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 219, 814 (hereafter MacCary and Willcock).

<sup>5</sup> MacCary and Willcock, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Pliny *H.N.* 13.24.